In typical reinforcement learning (RL), the environment is assumed given and the goal of the learning is to identify an optimal policy for the agent taking actions through its interactions with the environment. In this paper, we extend this setting by considering the environment is not given, but controllable and learnable through its interaction with the agent at the same time. Theoretically, we find a dual Markov decision process (MDP) w.r.t. the environment to that w.r.t. the agent, and solving the dual MDP-policy pair yields a policy gradient solution to optimizing the parametrized environment. Furthermore, environments with discontinuous parameters are addressed by a proposed general generative framework. While the idea is illustrated by an extended two-agent rock-paper-scissors game, our experiments on a Maze game design task show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in generating diverse and challenging Mazes against different agents with various settings.
Introduction
Reinforcement learning (RL) is typically concerned with a scenario where an agent (or multiple agents) taking actions and receiving rewards from an environment (Kaelbling, Littman, and Moore, 1996) , and the goal of the learning is to find an optimal policy for the agent that maximizes the cumulative reward when interacting with the environment. Successful applications include playing games (Mnih et al., 2013; Silver et al., 2016) , scheduling traffic signal (Abdulhai, Pringle, and Karakoulas, 2003) , regulating ad bidding (Cai et al., 2017) , to name just a few.
In most RL approaches, such as SARSA and Q-learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) , the model of the environment is, however, not necessarily known a priori before learning the optimal policy for the agent. Alternatively, model-based approaches, such as DYNA (Sutton, 1990) and prioritized sweeping (Moore and Atkeson, 1993) , require establishing the environment model while learning the optimal policy. But nonetheless, in either case, the environment is assumed given and mostly either fixed or non-stationary without a purposive control (Kaelbling, Littman, and Moore, 1996) .
In this paper, we extend the standard RL setting by considering the environment is strategic and controllable. We aim at learning to design an environment via interacting with an * The work is done during Haifeng Zhang's visit at UCL. Correspondence to Jun Wang, jun.wang@cs.ucl.ac.uk also learnable agent or multiple agents. This has many potential applications, ranging from designing a game (environment) with a desired level of difficulties in order to fit the current player's learning stage (Togelius and Schmidhuber, 2008) and designing shopping space to impulse customers purchase and long stay (Penn, 2005) to controlling traffic signals (Ceylan and Bell, 2004) .
Our formulation extends the scope of RL by focusing on the environment modelling and control. We illustrate the idea by a simple two-agent probabilistic rock-paper-scissors game. Particularly, in an adversarial case, on the one hand, the agent aims to minimize its accumulated reward; on the other hand, the environment tends to minimize the reward for a given optimal policy from the agent. This effectively creates a minimax game between the agent and the environment. Given the agent's playing environment MDP, we, theoretically, find a dual MDP w.r.t. the environment, i.e., how the environment could decide or sample the successor state given the agent's current state and an action taken. Solving the dual MDP yields a policy gradient solution (Williams, 1992) to optimize the parametric environment achieving its objective. When the environment's parameters are not continuous, we propose a generative modeling framework using reinforcement learning for optimizing the parametric environment, which overcomes the constraints on the environment space. Our experiments on a Maze game generation task show the effectiveness of generating diverse and challenging Mazes against various types of agents in different settings. We show that our algorithms would be able to successfully find the weaknesses of the agents and play against them to generate purposeful environments.
Related Work
Reinforcement learning (RL) (Sutton and Barto, 1998) studies how an intelligent agent learns to take actions through the interaction with an environment (e.g., the state of a game) over time. In a typical RL setting, the environment is unknown yet fixed, and the focus is on optimizing the agent policies. Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) is a marriage of deep neural networks (LeCun, Bengio, and Hinton, 2015) and RL; it makes use of deep neural networks as a function approximator in the decision-making framework of RL to achieve human-level control and general intelligence (Mnih et al., 2015) . In this paper, instead, we consider a family of problems that is an extension of RL by considering that the environment is controllable and strategic. Unlike typical RL, our subject is the strategic environment not the agent, and the aim is to learn to design an optimal (game) environment via the interaction with the intelligent agent.
Technically, our work is related to safe reinforcement learning, which maximizes the expectation of the return under some safety constraints such as uncertainty (Garcıa and Fernández, 2015) . The uncertainty may be introduced by two sources: 1) the inherent source from the stochastic state transition matrix and the stochastic agent policy (Heger, 1994; Gaskett, 2003) ; and 2) the estimation of the uncertainty from the parameters of MDP (Nilim and El Ghaoui, 2005; Tamar, Xu, and Mannor, 2013; Arjovsky, Chintala, and Bottou, 2017) . Our formulation shares some similarities with the latter one, due to the used parametric MDPs. However, our problem setting is entirely different from safe RL as their focus is still on single agent learning in an unknown environment, whereas our our work is concerned with the learning of the environment to achieve its own objective.
Our formulation is a general one, applicable in the setting where there are multiple agents (Busoniu and De Schutter) (see our toy example). It is worth mentioning that although multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) studies the strategic interplays among different entities, the game (either collaborative or competitive) is strictly among multiple agents (Littman, 1994; Hu and Wellman, 2003) . By contrast, the strategic interplays in our formulation are between an agent (or multiple agents) and the environment. The recent work, interactive POMDPs (Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi, 2005) , aims to separate beliefs over physical states of the environment and over models of other agents, but the environment in question is still non-strategic. Our problem, thus, cannot be formulated directly using MARL as the decision making of the environment is in an episode-level, while policies of agents typically operate in each time step.
The minimax game formulation can also be found in the recently emerged generative adversarial nets (GANs), where a generator and a discriminator play a minimax adversarial game (Goodfellow et al., 2014) . Compared to GANs, our work addresses a different problem, where the true samples of desired environments are missing in our scenario; the training of our environment generator is guided by the behaviours of the agent (corresponding the GAN discriminator) who aims to maximize its cumulative reward in a given environment. However, the environment generator itself may have a different objective.
In parallel, the design of computer and video games has been formulated by mechanic, dynamic and aesthetic (MDA) models (Hunicke, LeBlanc, and Zubek, 2004) . For generating games that conform to design requirements, answer set programming (ASP) is successfully applied (Zook and Riedl, 2014) . Taking optimization goals (such as balancing) into consideration, genetic algorithm (GA) is proposed as a searcher for optimal game designs (Hom and Marks, 2007) . Our work instead formulates the game design problem by extending Markov decision process (MDP) and provides sound solutions for designing video games using reinforcement learning, which shall be explored for future work. 1: Parametrized winning rates of the extended rockpaper-scissors game. The first column and the first row are the actions of player 1 and 2 respectively. The numbers or parameters in cells represent winning rates of player 1. rock paper scissors rock 0.5 w rp w rs paper w pr 0.5 w ps scissors w sr w sp 0.5
RL with Controllable Environment Problem Formulation
Let us first consider the standard reinforcement learning framework. In this framework there are a learning agent and a Markov decision process (MDP) M = S, A, P, R, γ , where S denotes state space, A action space, P state transition probability function, R reward function and γ discounted factor. The agent interacts with the MDP by taking action a in state s and observe reward r in each timestep, resulting in a trajectory of states, actions and rewards:
The agent selects actions according to a policy π φ , where π φ (a|s) defines the probability that the agent selects action a in state s. The agent learns π φ to maximize the return (cumulative reward) G = ∞ t=1 γ t−1 R t . In the standard setting, the MDP is given fixed while the agent is flexible with its policy to achieve its objective. We extends this setting by also giving flexibility and purpose to M. Specifically, we parametrize P as P θ and set the objective of the MDP as O(H), which can be arbitrary based on the agent's historical behaviours. We intend to design (generate) a MDP achieves the objective along with the agent achieving its own objective:
(1)
If it is a multi-agent RL setting, the objective function is:
where π −i φ * denotes the joint optimal policy of all the agents except agent i.
A Toy Example Let us consider a simple extension of the rock-paper-scissors game to illustrate what the solution of Eq. (2) looks like. In the Rock-paper-scissors game, two players select their hand shapes from rock(r), paper(p) and scissors(s) simultaneously. If a player wins the game, it get a reward of 1, otherwise 0. Instead of making the winning rule deterministic: rock > scissors > paper > rock, in Table 1 , we parametrize the game environment by considering certain probabilities for winning. The policy of player i = 1, 2 is π i (rock) = a r i , π i (paper) = a p i , π i (scissors) = a s i = 1 − a r i − a p i . The objective of the environment is to make the game as fair as possible, i.e., equalize the expected rewards of the players:
where w denotes w rp , w rs , w ps , w pr , w sr , w sp . Intuitively, w rs = 1 − w sr , w rp = 1 − w pr , w sp = 1 − w ps should be a sufficient condition of w * since it makes the rewards of the two players symmetrical. Here we briefly derive the solution analytically to strengthen the understanding of the proposed problem. We write down the expressions of the expectations in Eq. (3):
(5) Given w, we derive the Nash equilibrium between the two players by taking partial derivatives of E 1 and E 2 with regard to corresponding parameters and set them to zero:
The solution is
That is to say, a r * 1 , a p * 1 , a r * 2 and a p * 2 can be expressed by functions of w. For page limit, we omit the detailed form of the functions. Substituting Eq. (7) into Eq. (4, 5), we get
Thus, the objective function in Eq.
(3) can be also expressed by a function of w. We take the gradient of the objective function and set it to zero:
Solving this equation, we will get the solution (or solution set) w * which fulfils Eq. (3). This toy example explicitly illustrates our problem formulation. Specifically, there are two levels of equilibria. The first one is between the agents, given a fixed environment, which is solved by Eq. (7). The Figure 1 : An example of adversarial maze design. The detailed definition of the maze environment is provided in the Appendix. In short, an agent tries to find the shortest path from the start to the end in a given maze map, while the maze environment tries to design a map to make the path taken by the agent longer. In the direction of φ, the parameter of an agent policy evolves, whereas in the direction of θ, the parameter of the maze environment evolves. The cumulative reward G is defined as the opposite number of the length of path.
second one is between the environment and the agents which is solved by Eq. (10).
This toy example is simple enough that we can write down the objective functions of the agents and the environment, then solve it analytically by taking gradients. However, most RL environments are more complex that cannot be solved analytically. We shall discuss how to solve them next.
Adversarial Environment In this paper, we consider a particular objective of MDP that the MDP acts as an adversarial environment minimizing the expected return of the single agent, i.e.,
This adversarial objective can be applied to design environments to analyse the weakness of the agent and its policy learning algorithms. The objective function is formulated as:
(11) The optimization objective is related to the Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game between the environment and the agent, in which the environment decides its parameter θ and the agent decides its parameter φ simultaneously.
Gradient of Transition Probability
In many cases, Eq. (11) can not be solved analytically. We propose an approach by which the environment (MDP) and the agent update their parameters iteratively. In each iteration, the environment updates its parameter by taking a step in its gradient direction then the agent updates its policy parameter by taking enough steps to be optimal w.r.t. the updated environment, as illustrated by Fig. 1 for learning the environment of a maze. Since the agent's policy can be updated using well-studied RL methods, we focus on the update methods for the environment. In each iteration, given the agent's policy parameter, the objective of the environment becomes:
To update environment, we try to find the gradient of the transition function w.r.t. θ. We derive the gradient by transferring this transition optimization problem to a well-studied policy optimization problem through a proposed concept of a duel MDP-policy pair. Definition 1 (Duel MDP-policy pair). For any MDP-policy
in M E corresponds to combination of successive state and action in M A ;
We can see that the dual MDP-policy pair in fact describes the same mechanism as the original MDP-policy pair from another perspective. From the environment's perspective, the state is the agent's state-action pair s, a and the action is the next state s of the agent; and the policy turns out to be the next state to transit given the current state and the agent's action in the current state.
We give three theorems to derive the gradient of the transition function. The proofs are given in the Appendix. Theorem 1. For an MDP-policy pair M A , π A and its duality M E , π E , the distribution of trajectory generated by M A , π A is the same as the distribution of a bijective trajectory generated by M E , π E .
Theorem 2. For an MDP-policy pair M A , π A and its duality M E , π E , the expected return of two bijective state-action trajectories, H A from M A , π A and H E from M E , π E , are equal.
Theorem 3. For an MDP-policy pair M A , π A and its duality M E , π E , the expected return of M A , π A is equal to the expected return of M E , π E , i.e.,
Theorem 2 can be understood by the equivalence between H A and H E and the same generating probability of them as 
generator update guide the Figure 2 : Framework dealing with discontinuous transitions. Generator generates environment parameter θ. For each M A θ , the agent policy is trained. Then the policy is tested in the generated environments and the returns are observed, which finally guide the generator to update.
given in Theorem 1. Theorem 3 naturally extends Theorem 2 from the single trajectory to the distribution of trajectory according to the same p.m.f. given by Theorem 1. Now we consider M A θ , π A and its duality M E , π E θ , where P A θ and π E θ are of the same form about θ. Given θ, P A θ and π E θ are exactly the same, resulting in
We then apply the policy gradient theorem (Sutton et al., 1999) on π E θ and derive the gradient for P A θ :
where J(θ) is cost function, Q E (s E , a E ) and V A (s A i ) are action-value function and value function of M E , π E θ and M A θ , π A respectively; and can be proved equal due to the equivalence of the two MDPs.
We name the gradient in Eq. (14) as transition gradient. Transition gradient can be used to update the transition function in an iterative way. In theory, it performs as well as policy gradient since it is equivalent to the policy gradient in the circumstance of the dual MDP-policy pair.
RL Generator for Discontinuous Transition
Although we have proved the equivalence between the transition optimization and the policy optimization problem in the above section, two significant characteristics separate the transition optimization problem from the equivalent policy optimization problem: 1) In practice, it is hard or impossible to design continuous (differentiable) P θ subject to the natural environment constraints, i.e., ensuring P θ ∈ P for continuous θ where P may not be continuous. For example, if we want to design a Maze game, the transition probability between two adjacent cells is either 0 or 1, depending on whether the target cell is wall or blank. Also the eligibility of a Maze (e.g. guarantee a valid path) will further make P discretized or pruned. These constraints result in difficulties in designing continuous P θ ∈ P. This problem is non-significant in policy optimization problems since the space of a stochastic policy is naturally continuous.
2) Transition is naturally defined stochastic, while policy is not necessary stochastic. Thus the model of transition should output a distribution over states while the model of policy can only decide a choice of action.
These two main differences make it difficult to apply conventional policy-based and value-based methods to the transition optimization problem. Policy-based methods (including policy gradient (Sutton et al., 1999) , CMA-ES (Hansen, Müller, and Koumoutsakos, 2003) , etc.) usually assume policy space continuous, so it is assumed transition function is continuous in our problem. Therefore, the derived transition gradient method or other policy search methods are not naturally applicable to discontinuous transition. Note that deterministic policy gradient (Silver et al., 2014) may handle the deterministic transitions, but it is also inapplicable to model other discontinuous cases. Moreover, value-based methods cannot naturally apply to most environments because they do not model probability distribution directly.
To deal with such situation, we propose a generative framework to find the optimal θ alternative to the gradient method. In general, we iteratively generate environments with different θ and test them using the correspondingly trained agent (illustrated in Fig. 2) . Specifically, we generate environment parameter θ using a generator µ w , then optimize w to obtain the (local) optimal w * and a corresponding optimal distribution of θ. Formally, our optimization objective is formulated as
(15) We model the generation process using an auxiliary MDP M µ , i.e., the generator µ w generates θ and updates w in a reinforcement learning way. The reason we adopt reinforcement learning other than supervised learning is that in this generative task, 1) there is no training data to describe the distribution of the desired environments so we cannot compute likelihood of generated environments and 2) we can only evaluate a generated environment through sampling, i.e., performing agents in the generated environment and get a score from the trajectory, which can be naturally modeled by reinforcement learning by viewing the score as a reward of the actions of the generator.
In detail, the generator µ w consists of three elements M µ , π µ w , f µ . For generating θ, an auxiliary agent with policy π µ w acts in M µ to generate a trajectory H µ , after that θ is determined by the transforming function θ = f µ (H µ ), i.e., the distribution of θ is given by the distribution of trajectories, which are induced by playing π µ w in M µ and transformed through f µ . For adversarial environments, the reward of the generator is designed to be opposite to the return of the agent got in H µ , which reflects the minimization objective in Eq. (15). Thus, w can be updated by applying policy gradient methods on π µ w . There are various ways to designing M µ . Here we provide a general design that follows the environment constraints. We reshape the elements of θ as a vector θ = x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N θ , x k ∈ X k and design M µ = S µ , A µ , P µ , R µ , γ µ to generate θ:
• P µ is defined that for the current state v k = x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k and an action x k+1 , if x k+1 ∈ X k+1 and v k+1 = x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k+1 ∈ S µ the next state is v k+1 , otherwise v k ; • R µ is defined that for terminal state v N θ = x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N θ = θ the reward is the opposite number of the averaged return got by π A φ * acting in M A θ , otherwise the reward is 0; • γ µ = 1 since there is no intermediate reward unless the terminal states.
In addition, the start state is v 0 = and the terminal states are v N θ = x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N θ . Corresponding to this M µ , π µ w (x k+1 |v k ; w) is designed to take an action x k+1 ∈ X k+1 depending on the previous generated sequence v k , and the transforming function f µ is designed as an identical function f µ (v N θ ) = f µ (θ) = θ. Note that due to the definition of S µ , any partial parameter v t without potential to be completed as a valid parameter θ s.t. P A θ ∈ P A is avoided to be generated. This ensures any constraint on environment can be followed. On the other hand, any valid θ is probable to be generated once π µ w is exploratory and of enough expression capacity.
The pseudo code of RL environment generator is provided in the Appendix.
Experiments with Maze Design Experiment Setting
In our experiment, we consider a use case of designing Maze game to test our solutions over the transition gradient method and the RL generator respectively. As shown in both Figures 4 and 5 , the Maze is a grid world containing a map of n × n cells. In every time-step, the agent is in a cell and has four directional actions {N, S, W, E} to select from, and transitions are made deterministically to an adjacent cell, unless there is a wall (e.g., the black cells as illustrated in Figures 4 and 5) , in which case no movement occurs. The minimax game is defined as: the agent should go from the northwest cell to the south-east cell using steps as little as possible, while the goal of the Maze environment is to arrange the walls in order to maximize the number of steps taken by the agent. To prevent generating walls that completely block the agent, the environment generator grows the walls gradually and discards the solutions when there is blocking. The precise formulation of the Maze game as MDP and the environment generation model µ w = M µ , π µ w , f µ are given in the Appendix.
Note that the above hard wall Maze results in an environment that is discontinuous. In order to also test the case of continuous environments, we consider a simpler soft wall Maze as illustrated in Figure 3 . Specifically, instead of a hard wall that blocks the agent completely, each cell except the end cell has a blockage probability (soft wall) which determines how likely the agent will be blocked in this cell when it takes transition action from an adjacent cell. In Figure 3 , the blockage probability is indicated by the intensity of the color in the cell. It is also ensured that the sum of blockage probabilities of all cells is 1 and the maximum blockage 
8×8 Return=87 Figure 4 : Best mazes against OPT, DFS, RHS and DQN agents with size ranging from 5 × 5 to 8 × 8.
probability for each cell is 0.5. Thus, the task for the adversarial environment in this case is to allocate the soft wall to each cell to block the agent the most.
The experiment is conducted on PCs with common CPUs. We implement our experiment environment using Keras-RL (Plappert, 2016) backed by Keras and Tensorflow. 2
Results for the Transition Gradient Method
We test the transition gradient method considering the 5 × 5 soft wall Maze case. We model the transition probability function by a deep convolutional neural network, which is updated by the transition gradient following Eq. (14). We consider the two types of agents: Optimal (OPT) agent and Deep Q-network learning (DQN) agent. The OPT agent is not learnable, but always finds the optimal policy against any generated environment. The DQN agent (Mnih et al., 2013 ) is a learnable one, in which the agent's action-value function is modeled by a deep neural network, which takes the whole map and its current position as input, processed by 3 convolutional layers and 1 dense layer, then outputs the Q-values over the four directions. Fig. 3 shows the convergence that our transition gradient method has achieved. The change of the learned environment parameters, in the form of blockage probabilities, over time are indicated by the color intensity. Intuitively, the most effective adversarial environment to block the agent is to place two 0.5 soft walls in the two cells next to the end or the beginning cell, as this would have the highest blockage probabilities. We can see that in both cases, using the OPT agent and the DQN agent, our learning method can obtain one of the two most optimal Maze environments. Besides, during the training, we find that if we train the DQN agent to achieve a reasonable good level then the environment would converge faster than that of the OPT agent case. This is because the OPT agent always choose the optimal policy, but the DQN agent may learn it during the play, which would add the exploration to the environment learning, and bring more chance to find the optimal learning directions. As evidenced in Fig. 3 , the DQN agent case begins to converge to the two almost optimal adversarial environments from the Round 100, ahead of the OPT agent case over 200 rounds. But then it slows down and it takes around 300 rounds to achieve the optimal. This is explained by the unnecessary exploration introduced by the DQN agent in the later stage. By contrast, the OPT agent only takes 100 rounds from the nearly optimal (Round 300) to the optimal.
Results for Reinforcement Learning Generator
We now test our reinforcement learning generator by the hard wall Maze environment. We follow the proposed general framework to design µ w = M µ , π µ w , f µ , where π µ w is modeled by a deep neural network. We test our generator against four types of agents each on four sizes of maps (from 5 × 5 to 8 × 8). Although the objective for every agent is to minimize the number of steps, not every agent has the ability to find the optimal policy because of model restrictions of π φ or limitations in the training phase. Therefore, besides testing our generator against the optimal agent (the OPT agent) and the DQN agent, we also adopt other two imperfect agents for our generator to design specific Mazes in order to understand more about our solution's behaviors. They are: Depth-first search (DFS) agent. The DFS agent searches the end in a depth-first way. In each time-step, without loss of generality, the DFS agent is set to select an action according to the priority of East, South, North, West. The DFS agent takes the highest priority action that leads to a blank and unvisited cell. If there are none, The DFS agent goes back to the cell from which it comes.
Right-hand search (RHS) agent. The RHS agent is aware of the heading direction and follows a strategy that always ensures that its right-hand cell is a wall or the border. In each time-step, 1) the RHS agent checks its right-hand cell, if it is blank, the RHS agent will turn right and step into the cell; 2) if not, then if the front cell is blank, the RHS agent will step forward; 3) if the front cell is not blank, the RHS agent will continue turning left until it faces a blank cell, then steps into that cell.
We also limit the network capacity and training time of the DQN agent to make it converge differently from the OPT agent. The learned optimal Mazes are given in Fig. 4 the OPT agent, shown in Fig. 4 (OPT) . We see that in all cases, from 5 × 5 to 8 × 8, our generator tends to design long narrow paths without any fork, which makes the optimal paths the longest. By contrast, the generator designs many forks to trap the DQN agent, shown in Fig. 4 (DQN) , as the DQN agent runs a stochastic policy.
In fact our generator would be able to make use of the weakness from the agents to design the maps against them. Fig. 4 (DFS) shows the results that our generator designs extremely broad areas with only one entrance for the DFS agent to search exhaustively (visit every cell in the closed area twice). Fig. 4 (RHS) shows the Mazes generated to trouble the RHS agent the most by creating a highly symmetric Maze.
Next, Fig. 5 shows the snapshots of the results in different learning rounds. 3 They all evolve differently, depending on the types of the agents. For the OPT agent, we find that our generator gradually links isolated walls to form a narrow but long path. For the DFS, our generator gradually encloses an area then broadens and sweeps it in order to best play against the policy that has the priority order of their travel directions. Fig. 5 (RHS) shows that our generator learns to adjust the wall into zigzag shapes to trouble the RHS agent. For the DQN agent, with limited network capacity or limited training time, it is usually the case that it cannot perfectly tell which road to go during the learning. As such, the generator tends to generate many forks to confuse the DQN agent.
Furthermore, Fig. 6 shows the process of training our generator against the four agents in 8 × 8 map. We find that for OPT, DFS and RHS agents, the generator learns rapidly at first and gradually converges. But for the DQN agent, the learning curve is tortuous, which illustrates the more adversarial process. This is because the ability of the DQN agent is gradually improved so it does not accurately and efficiently guide the learning of the generator. Also when the ability of the DQN agent improves more than the progress 3 A series of video demos that show how the environments evolve can be found at https://goo.gl/iXbDct.
(1) OPT
(2) DFS
(3) RHS (4) DQN of the generator, the learning curve for the generator may change its direction for several rounds.
Conclusions
In this paper, we presented an extension of standard reinforcement learning by considering that the environment is strategic and can be learned based on the interaction with the agent(s) and the feedback about its performance. We derived a gradient update by introducing a dual MDP-policy pair for the cases where the transition probability is continuous. To deal with non-continuous transitions, we proposed a novel generative framework using reinforcement learning. We evaluated the effectiveness of our solution by considering designing a Maze game. Our experiments showed that our method can make use of the weaknesses of agents to learn the environment effectively.
In the future, we plan to apply the proposed method to practical environment design tasks, such as video game de-sign (Hom and Marks, 2007) , shopping space design (Penn, 2005) and bots routine planning.
Formally, a maze has a map defined as m i,j ∈ {BLANK, WALL}, i = 1 . . . n, j = 1 . . . n, where m 1,1 and m n,n are always BLANK as being the start cell and the end cell respectively. Thus, the agent acts in this maze should find a policy that walk from the start cell to the end cell using steps as few as possible. On the other hand, our objective is to design a maze that maximizes the steps against the agent. MDP M M = S M , A M , P M , R M , γ M describes the rule of the maze with map m:
where p x , p y denotes the current position in maze;
• action set A M = { 1, 0 , −1, 0 , 0, −1 , 0, 1 }, which represents the four directions North, South, West and East; • P M is defined that for state s = p x , p y and action a = d x , d y , the next state s = p x + d x , p y + d y if p x + d x , p y + d y is inside the map and m px+dx,py+dy = BLANK, otherwise s = s; • R M is defined that for every step, the agent gets a reward −1; • γ M = 1.
The start state 1, 1 and the terminal state is n, n . The map is guaranteed to include a path from the the start cell to the end cell.
The Definition of the Proposed Generative Model for Maze Games
As introduced in Sec. 3.3, our framework for solving undifferentiable transition includes three elements M µ , π µ w , f µ . With respect to the maze problem, we firstly define M µ as follows:
• S µ consists of all valid maps m, where m i,j ∈ {BLANK, WALL}, i, j ∈ Z, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, m 1,1 = BLANK, m n,n = BLANK and there exists a path from m 1,1 to m n,n ; • A µ consists of n × n + 1 actions, including n × n twodimensional coordinate x, y , x, y ∈ Z, 1 ≤ x, y ≤ n and an action END; • P µ is defined that for current state m and an action a, the next state m satisfies: m = m and the MDP terminates, for a = END, or a = x, y and m x,y = WALL, or setting m x,y = WALL will isolate m 1,1 from m n,n in m;
otherwise m i,j = m i,j i, j = x, y WALL i, j = x, y • R µ is defined that if the MDP terminates the reward is the opposite number to the averaged return got by the target agent acting in M M which is determined by the terminal state m, otherwise the reward is 0; • γ µ = 1;
• the start state is m 0 that m 0 i,j = BLANK, i, j ∈ Z, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
Corresponding to M µ , π µ w takes the half-generated map m as its input and outputs the possibilities of taking the n × n + 1 actions. π µ w is modelled by a deep neural network consists of three convolutional layers each with 32 filters and one dense layer. 4 The transformation function f µ transforms m to P M in the same way as described in the definition of maze above.
Proofs for deriving Transition Gradient
Theorem 1. For an MDP-policy pair M A , π A and its duality M E , π E , the distribution of trajectory generated by M A , π A is the same as the distribution of a bijective trajectory generated by M E , π E .
Proof. For any state-action trajectory H A = S 1 , A 1 , S 2 , A 2 , . . . , S T −1 , A T −1 , S T generated by M A , π A , there exists a bijective state-action trajectory H E generated by M E , π E : H E = S 1 , A 1 , S 2 , S 2 , A 2 , S 3 , . . . , S T −1 , A T −1 , S T , whose generating probability is equal to H A :
Proof.
Theorem 3. For an MDP-policy pair M A , π A and its duality M E , π E , the expected return of M A , π A is equal to the expected return of M E , π E , i.e.
